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GEORGE H. DESSION t
THE care and custody of the mentally ill has customarily been considered
a state and local rather than a federal function. Certainly the major burden
of performing this task of public assistance and police protection is car-
ried by local government agencies, to the extent that it does not still rest
on the shoulders of families and relatives. It is also customarily believed
that the mentally ill or defective offender is infrequently encountered in
federal law enforcement. For there have been fewer homicide trials in
federal courts than in state courts, and it is in such cases that the defense
of insanity is most often raised. Homicide apart, a conception of federal
crime as typified by larger scale depredations and more complex schemes
than the delinquencies popularly associated with mental cases has also
been rather widespread and misleading.1 Although these two notions
regarding the incidence of mental cases in the federal penal process once
had a factual basis, they are increasingly invalid, both because of the pro-
gressive expansion of federal criminal legislation and the fact that we
have only recently begun to learn to recognize mental illness readily.
The purpose of this article is to reappraise the problem of the mentally
ill offender against federal law, i.e., to examine the problem of the offender
against accepted social interests, whose personality deviates, from a psy-
chiatric viewpoint, from the norm or norms attributed to the group treated
as "criminal". It is proposed also to evaluate the existing federal statutory
provisions, together with current procedures and administrative arrange-
ments for this class of offenders.
2
The term "offender" is used advisedly to denote a larger category than
"criminal". For when an offender's personality deviation is recognized
as of a certain degree and quality, it is one of the tenets of our law that
he may not, consonant with due process, be brought to trial or sentenced;
if such was the state of his personality at the time of the offense, it is also
t Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. This statement, appearing as recently as 1938 in HousE. AND WALSER, DEENDING
AND PROSECUTING FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES (1938) § 397, is a fair sample: "A defense
of insanity seldom appears in Federal criminal cases, due no doubt to the generally involved
nature and preparation required for the commission of a federal offense, and consequently
there is little discussion and authority on the subject of insanity as a defense or bar to
prosecution."
2. For a discussion of the roles of the psychiatrist and the psychologist in connection
with the trial, sentencing, and disposition of offenders generally, see Dession, Psychialry
and the Conditioning of Criminal Justice (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 319.
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well established that he is not to be regarded or treated as a criminal. But
in each instance the offender may still be regarded and treated as a police
problem; in each situation, there is legal authorization for his removal from
the community and commitment to a custodial institution. The distinctitn
is thus one both of assumed moral status and of administrative jurisdic-
tion.
Unfortunately, however, the present federal criminal prucedure and
administrative practice fail to screen out many offenders who, in light of
contemporary psychiatric theory, belong in the category of the mentally
ill or defective. As a result many persons are subjected to criminal pro-
ceedings in violation of the constitutional requirement of due process. To
some of them the trial is an ordeal as devastating as it is unnecessary. Tr,
the government the result is an inappropriate and even socially harmful
expenditure of prosecution resources. When such an individual is con-
victed and sentenced the result is even less excusable. The problem is
one for treatment, but of a quite different kind from that which the Bu-
reau of Prisons is equipped to give. And the conviction destroys, without
justification, such reputation as the individual may have possessed.
Of course, some of the mentally ill are spotted before conviction. The
criminal proceeding is then suspended if not dropped altogether; but the
offender may still be a public menace. Here the existing provisions for
an alternative federal disposition are inadequate. Or the illness may be
detected after a prisoner enters upon the service of a sentence of imprison-
ment. It may then appear that the prisoner was probably mentally ill at
the time of trial, and even at the time of the commission of the offense;
or the illness may appear to have developed or reached an aggravated
stage only after he began serving his sentence. In either of these situa-
tions the prisoner can be transferred by an administrative order to an insti-
tution for the care and custody of the mentally ill; the federal govern-
ment maintains several institutions for this purpose. But in the first
situation, the injustice involved in the conviction and commitment of
the offender as a criminal stands uncorrected; in both the provision for
federal care and custody is inadequate in that it does not extend beyond
the maximum period of the criminal sentence, however mentally ill and
dangerous the prisoner may then be.
MENTAL ILLNESS OR DEFECT As A BAR To PROSECUTION
The Standard and its Application. Under current practice, the issue of
the offender's sanity may be raised in the first instance in order to ascer-
tain whether he is presently triable. For, at Anglo-American common
law, mental illness of the accused or the presence of a defect amounting to
"insanity" bar further proceedings in a criminal case. Under our Consti-
tution, this conditioning of the validity of a criminal proceeding upon the
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sanity of the accused is considered a requirement of due process.' Accord-
ingly, the legislation dealing with the disposition of persons charged with
offenses against the United States and found to be insane implicity assumes
that such persons are not to be prosecuted so long as they remain mentally
ill.
The considerations of policy underlying this view are historically com-
plex and in part forgotten, as is the case with so many of the institutions
of this most ancient branch of law. Those which commend themselves to-
day are expressed in the current formulation of the standard for ascertain-
ing whether offenders are mentally capable of undergoing trial.
To date, Congress has left formulation of this standard to the courts.
The terms "sanity" and "insanity" are now merely legal concepts. Though
there was a time when they were also considered medical concepts, it is
observable today that these legal criteria trouble the conscientious expert
witness, since they do not correspond with modern psychiatric conceptions
and classifications. Criteria such as those advanced in McNaght en's case 4
the so-called "right and wrong" test-employ alleged 'psychological con-
cepts, which actually fail to jibe with the expert's clinical experience, and
have hence been of little help to him. These legal terms must, therefore,
be regarded as no more than short-hand expressions of a policy with re-
spect to the kinds of offenders who shall be dealt with by one set of gov-
ernmental correctional processes, i.e., the "criminal", and the kinds who
shall be dealt with by another and quite distinct set, i.e., the "insane". 5
It follows that sanity for purposes of present triability need not neces-
sarily mean the same thing as sanity in the sense of criminal responsibility
for an act; in fact, the courts have recognized this distinction.0 The
standardof present triability which appears to have met with approval in
the federal courts is that formulated by Judge Jones in his instruction to
the jury in the Chisholm case. ' The issue is whether the accused has "suffi-
cient mental power, and has such understanding of his situation, such
coherency of ideas, control of his mental faculties and the requisite power
of memory, as will enable him to testify in his own behalf, if he so desires,
and otherwise to properly and intelligently aid his counsel in making a
rational defense."
Application of this standard requires court and administrative procedures
that fulfill two functions. First, offenders exhibiting symptoms which
3. -ousE.t & WALSER, op. cit. supra note 1, § 397; Youtsey v. United States, 97 Fed.
937, 940 (C. C. A. 6th, 1899). See Forthoffer v. Swope, 103 F. (2d) 707 (C. C. A. 9th,
1939).
4. 10 Cl. & Fin. 200 (1843).
5. See Dession, mipra note 2.
6. See United States v. Boylen, 41 F. Supp. 724, 725 (D. Ore. 1941) ; United States v.
Chisholm, 149 Fed. 284, 285, 286 (S. D. Ala. 1906).
7. United States v. Chisholm, 149 Fed. 284, 285, 286 (S. D. Ala. 1906).
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suggest any serious question as to triability should be screened out for
subjection to the legal test. Second, sufficient technical and background in-
formation must be made available to the judge so that the issue of triabilit"
may be intelligently determined. Hence, the question arises as to the ade-
quacy with which current federal procedures accomplish these objectives.
Under current practice, the question of the offender's triability may be
raised at any stage in a criminal proceeding. Where it is raised before
trial, the accused is entitled at least to a preliminary inquiry by the court,
which may, however, be ex parte; mere inspection by the court may suffice.
The court's duty at this stage is only to entertain the motion and deter-
mine whether the question is raised in good faith and upon plausible
grounds; the record should show that such duty has been exercised."
Since no specific procedures for determining finally the issue of tri-
ability are prescribed by statute, the courts have looked for guidance to
the common law. Several methods are thought to be authorized: (1) com-
mitment of the accused to an institution for observation and report; (2)
appointment of a commission to examine and report; and (3) the holding
of a formal judicial hearing. Whatever method is followed, there can ht
no valid final determination of the issue without notice and opportunity
for the accused to present evidence and be heard.1" Whether this final
determination shall be made before trial or reserved for trial rests in the
discretion of the judge."
Where the method employed is that of a formal hearing, the accused'.
evidence is heard first, and he has the burden, according to the more recent
decisions, of overcoming the ordinary presumption of sanity by creating a
reasonable doubt' The hearing may be held with or without the assistance
of a special jury, in the discretion of the court, as in the proceeding on the
common law writ de huatico inquirendo.3 There appears to be no par-
ticularly settled practice throughout the United States, with respect to the
use of a jury. Judge Caffey stated in his opinion in the Harriman case 14
in 1933 that no one recalled an instance where a jury had been used for
this purpose in the Southern District of New York. In other districts,
there are reported instances of submission of the issue to a jury, and a
form of verdict for such submission is contained in Judge Jones' charge
8. See Note (1943) 142 A. L. R. 961; Youtsey v. United States, 97 Fed. 937 (C. C. A.
6th, 1899); United States v. Boylen, 41 F. Supp. 724 (D. Ore. 1941) ; United States v.
Harriman, 4 F. Supp. 186 (S. D. N. Y. 1933).
9. See the authorities cited supra note 8.
10. Youtsey v. United States, 97 Fed. 937 (C. C. A. 6th, 1899).
11. Ibid. See Whitney v. Zerbst, 62 F. (2d) 970, 972 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933).
12. Note (1900) 34 L. R. A. (ns.) 1115; United States v. Chisholm, 149 Fed. 2Z4
(S. D. Ala. 1906).
13. United States v. Harriman, 4 F. Supp. 186 (S. D. N. Y. 1933).
14. Id. at 187.
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in the Chishohi case."6 Where so employed, the jury's function is, of
course, as in common law lunacy proceedings, merely advisory.
Whatever the procedure followed, federal courts usually obtain psychi-
atric reports and advice. Depending on the facilities available in the area,
they may resort for such assistance to the Bureau of Prisons, to the
United States Public Health Service, or to physicians on the panel list
prepared by the Public Health Service and circulated through the Adminis-
trative Office of the United States Courts. Alternatively, the courts may
obtain assistance from local clinics or physicians in private practice.
Sometimes the inquiry is on motion of the accused; in any event it is
comnon practice to obtain his consent.1 G But presumably the court may
inquire into this issue of its own motion and order a psychiatric examina-
tion or commit the accused for observation even though he has been ad-
mitted to bail.' Some question has arisen as to the privilege against self-
incrimination, with respect to statements which may be elicited from the
accused in the course of such an examination. 8 No federal adjudication on
this point has been found; however, the New York Court of Appeals )was
confronted with this problem in the Esposito case 19 in 1942. Pursuant to
pleas of present insanity, the trial court had committed the accused for ob-
servation before trial. During the commitment, metrasol and sodium amytal
(inhibition-relieving drugs or "truth serums") had been administered, in
connection with the psychiatric interrogation to determine whether the
accused were malingerers or were actually insane. Appealing from an
adverse determination, the accused contended that this constituted a violation
of their privileges against self-incrimination. However, the Court of
Appeals ruled that in so far as the inquiry was into the issue of sanity, there
had been no violation. It is believed that the federal courts should adopt
a similar view.
It thus appears that where the issue of an offender's triability is raised
before the trial, the federal courts have ample power to inquire into his san-
ity. There should be no great difficulty from a budgetary point of view,
since funds have been appropriated from time to time from which the
fees of psychiatrists appointed by the courts may be paid.
15. United States v. Chisholm, 149 Fed. 284,285 (S. D. Ala. 1906).
16. See United States v. Harriman, 4 F. Supp. 186, 187 (S. D. N. Y. 1933).
17. Id. at 186-7, and the following general statement: "Courts have (at least in the
absence of legislation to the contrary) inherent power to provide themselves with appro-
priate instruments for the performance of their duties.... This power includes authority
to appoint persons unconnected with the court to aid judges ir the performance of specific
judicial duties, as they may arise in the progress of a cause." Ex parte Peterson, 253 U. S.
300, 312 (1920).
18. See United States v. Boylen, 41 F. Supp. 724, 725, 726 (D. Ore. 1941).
19. People v. Esposito, 287 N. Y. 389, 39 N. E. (2d) 925 (1942).
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However, where the issue of mental illness or defect as of the time of
trial is raised for the first time at a later stage, as for example after verdict
or finding of guilt or even after sentence, the situation is less clear. In a
proper case, relief should presumably be available on motion for a new
trial or in arrest of judgment, subject, of course, to the standing time
limits on these motions. However, there was some suggestion in the Lee
case in the Fifth Circuit, that a motion in arrest of judgment on this ground
is addressed merely to the discretion of the court.?
Where resort to these motions is barred by limitations, there is common
law precedent for relief through the writ of error corani ,obis;2' it is not
settled, however, whether the federal courts will exercise a similar jurisdic-
tion." The remaining possibility is habeas corpus. On the theory that an
accused whose mental capacities fall below the standard formulated in the
Chisholm case is incompetent to plead, and to assist counsel or waive coun-
sel, it is probable, in the light of recent decisions of the Supreme Court, that
such relief is now available.23 This was suggested in the recent Forthoffcr
case in the Ninth Circuit, but not decided, as the court felt that, in any
event, the petitioner had failed to show that he was sub-standard mentally
at the time of entering his plea, or that his waiver of counsel was not
competent.24
The chief deficiency of current processes for determining nontriability
and for screening out offenders is that, in many districts, the administra-
tive patterns are such that the initiative in raising the question of mental
illness before trial is left pretty much to the defendant. For in most in-
stances the mentally ill defendant does not consider himself incapacitated;
moreover, like other federal defendants, he is frequently represented by
assigned counsel, if any. The result is that the initiative is too infrequently
exercised. During a six month period in 1943, for example, it was the
experience of the Bureau of Prisons that over 100 seriously mentally ill
or very feeble-minded persons were convicted and sentenced. The condi-
tion may well be on the increase, since the expansion of federal criminal
law is bringing numerous new categories of offenders into federal custody.
How, then, is a greater awareness of the symptoms of mental illness and
defect to be stimulated among those who come into official and professional
contact with accused persons before trial? Of course, this is basically a
20. See Lee v. United States, 91 F. (2d) 326, 331 (C. C A. 5th, 1937).
21. See Lamb v. Florida, 91 Fla. 396, 107 So. 535 (1926) ; People v. Reid, 195 Cal. 249,
232 Pac. 457 (1924); Orfield, Application of Writ of Error Coram Naobis in Ncbraska
(1932) 10 Nam. L. Buu. 314.
. 22. See Robinson v. Johnston, 118 F. (2d) 993 (C. C. A. 901, 1941), 130 F. (2d) 202
(C. C. A. 9th, 1942), remanded on other grounds, 316 U. S. 649 (1942).
23. See WValey v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101 (1942) ; Walker v. Johnston, 312 U. S. 275
(1941); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938).
24. See Forthoffer v. Swope, 103 F. (2d) 707, 710 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939).
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problem in the education of such persons-the commissioners, the mar-
shalls, the prosecuting and defense attorneys, the probation officers, and
the judges. Not that they need be or should be psychiatrists. What is
required is sufficient training to enable them to know when and how to
utilize the assistance of psychiatrists.
In addition to such long range education, one possible remedy might be
to build on the provision for pre-sentence investigations and reports con-
tained in the present Probation Act.25 The Act does not now prescribe the
time when the investigation shall be made; in some districts, indeed, it is
felt that a probation officer should not interview the defendant until after
the verdict or finding of guilt. The scope of the investigation is similarly
not prescribed; nor is it required that the investigations be made unless
the court so directs. Hence the practice varies from district to district. It
has been estimated that investigations are now made in about half of all
cases, but they generally do not include psychiatric examination.
Another method for insuring the early detection of mental illness would
be devisal of an administrative arrangement for the routine medical exam-
ination of all federal prisoners held in county jails or other places of de-
tention, pending indictment or trial. Local physicians would be available
for this purpose, and, assuming the utilization only of those having some
familiarity with psychiatry, even a cursory examination should serve to
uncover a great many of the cases of mental illness.
The much discussed Briggs Law of Massachusetts 20 suggests a fourth
method. Originally enacted in 1921, the law requires a psychiatric examin-
ation by or under the auspices of the Department of Mental Health of all
accused persons falling within the following categories: (1) persons in-
dicted by a grand jury for a capital offense; (2) persons indicted or bound
over for trial in the Superior Court who have previously been convicted
of a felony; and (3) persons indicted or bound over who have previously
been indicted more than once for any other offense.
The Briggs Law has the virtue of discarding the widespread but mis-
taken notion that while physical diseases require professional diagnosis,
mental disease can be detected by any sensible person upon simple obser-
vation. Examinations -are conducted by neutral experts and at an
25. 43 STAT. 1259 (1925), 46 STAT. 503 (1930), 18 U. S. C. §727 (1940). Concerning
the present practice see ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRCrOR OF THE ADMINxISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS (1941) tables 24 and 28; Ta PRESENTENcE INVESTIGATION
(Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Division of Probation, 1942) ; AorroaNIY
GENERAL'S SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES, PROBATION (1939) 174.
26. 4 MAss. LAWS A, . (Michie 1942), c. 123, § 100 A. See WIriuoFE , INSANITY
As A DEFENSE IN CR MNAL LAW (1933) 403-406; Overholser, Some Possible Contribn-
tions of Psychiatry to a More Effective Administration of the Crininal Law (1939) 17
CAN. B. REv. 638; The Briggs Law of Massachusetts: A Review and an Appraisal (1935)
25 J. CRIM. L. & CiumiNotooY 859.
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appropriately early stage in the proceedings. The effects of this Iav havc
unquestionably been beneficial, despite the inadequacy of appropria-
tions for payment of examining physicians' fees and the occasional neces-
sity for conducting the examinations on very short notice-in a few in-
stances in the prisoner's room at the courthouse, while the judge waited
for the result
2 7
The defect of the Briggs Law is its limitation to the categories of de-
fendants previously described. Not that automatic provision for the
examination of all defendants would be either necessary or desirable. In
federal practice, for example, there would be no point in providing psychi-
atric examination for all corporation executives charged with violation
of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, or all violators of the Migratory Bird
statute. The real objection to the classification adopted in the Briggs
Law is that there is little evidence to suggest any high correlation between
the categories of defendants singled out and the incidence of mental illness
or defect. The same objection would probably hold as to any other classi-
fication in terms of the crime charged, or of its legal severity or the offend-
er's recidivistic record. Yet the legislative medium would hardly lend itself
to an attempt to classify offenders in terms of symptoms of mental disorders.
Disposition. Once it is determined that an offender can not be legally
tried by reason of mental illness or defect the next question is how to dis-
pose of him. At common law, such offenders were committed to custodial
institutions until such time, if ever, as they recovered sufficiently to be
triable." In earlier days this meant commitment to jail; in general, under
modem practice, it means commitment to an institution for the treatment
of the mentally ill. Such commitment assumes, of course, a prior judicial
determination as to the mental state of the accused.2  This practice is
adopted in existing federal legislation, which, however, is incomplete in cov-
erage. The omissions appear to reflect both doubt as to the legal basis for
federal jurisdiction over the mentally ill and defective, and doubt, assuni-
ing the technical jurisdiction, as to the policy of treating such persons as
federal rather than state charges.
It is submitted nevertheless that the jurisdictional basis for commitment
to an institution is clear. Existing statutes provide for the federal commit-
ment of insane persons who fall into a number of categories. These in-
27. See GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMIINAL LAw (1925) 60; Kidd,
California Legislation In Regard to Crime for 1929, 17 CALIF. L. RE%. 537, 542; Overholser,
Psychiatry and the Massachusetts Courts As Now Related (1929) 8 SoMAx. ForEcs 77;
Tulin, Problem of Mental Disorder in Crime (1932) 32 CoL. L. REv. 933, 942.
28. See Youtsey v. United States, 97 Fed. 937, 940 (C. C. A. 6th, 1899).
29. Simon v. Craft, 182 U. S. 427 (1901) ; Barry v. Hall, 93 F. (2d) 222 (App. D. C.
1938) ; Ex Pare Dries, 3 App. D. C. 165 (1S94) ; 30 Ops. ATrr'v GN. (1916) 569; cf.
White v. Treibly, 19 F. (2d) 712 (App. D. C., 1927).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
elude insane persons in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard,
including in various instances retired personnel; civilians who become
insane while employed in the Quartermaster Corps of the Army; insane
prisoners of war and interned persons; Foreign Service personnel adjudged
insane in a foreign country; insane patients of the Public -Iealth Service,
including merchant seamen; American citizens adjudged insane in the
Canal Zone, in Canada, and in the Virgin Islands; as well as insane persons
charged with a federal offense.
3°
In some of these instances, commitment may be justified on the theory
that the insane person belongs to a group, in whose care and protection the
federal government has a special interest. As the court said with refer-
ence to the commitment of a retired naval officer in the Treibly case :"1
"His care and protection, while thus incapacitated and unable to act for
himself, are the concern and duty of the government." Much the same
line of reasoning was employed in the Barry case,32 involving a merchant
seaman. The principle is akin to the parens patriae concept usually invoked
as a basis for the state commitment of delinquent and neglected juveniles.
But the guardianship or special obligation relationship is not the only
recognized basis for the commitment of an individual in our law. In
federal practice, an innocent material witness may also be committed to
insure his presence at a criminal trial.3 An accused person lawfully ar-
rested may be committed in federal as in state criminal proceedings where it
appears necessary to insure his presence at the trial assuming that lie does
not furnish bail or that the crime charged is one where release on bail is
not required. Jurors may be ordered confined during all recesses for the
duration of a criminal proceeding to insure their freedom from pressure
and influence. In the De Marcos case " the court upheld federal commit-
ment of an American citizen, who had been found insane in Canada but
who on transfer to the United States was found to have no ascertainable
legal residence in any state, territory, or in the District of Columbia. In
all these instances, the legal principles invoked emphasize the welfare and
protection of the public, rather than of the individual committed. The
common denominator underlying these varied situations is that the federal
government is employing commitment as an instrument for the protec-
30. 38 STAT. 801 (1915), 37 STAT. 591 (1912); 40 STAT. 373 (1917), 40 STAT. 644
(1918); 54 STAT. 1236 (1940); 54 STAT. 1236 (1939); 54 STAT. 766 (1940); 54 STAT.
1236 (1940) ; 24 U. S. C. §§ 191, 191(a), 192, 193, 196, 196(a) and (b), 211-12 (1940).
31. White v. Treibly, 19 F. (2d) 712, 713 (App. D. C. 1927).
32. Barry v. Hall, 98 F. (2d) 222, 224 (App. D. C. 1938).
33. 1 STAT. 91 (1789), 2 STAT. 167 (1802), 5 STAT. 517 (1842), 9 STAT. 73 (1846),
24 STAT. 635 (1887), 36 STAT. 1167 (1911), 28 U. S. C. §§657-60 (1940).
34. DeMarcos v. Overholser, 122'F. (2d) "16 (App. D. C. 1941); cerl. denied, 314
U. S. 609 (1941), rehearing denied,'314 U. S. 714 (1941).
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tion of federal interests or as a necessary adjunct to the exercise of federal
powers.
In the case of the person who is taken into custody on a. federal charge
and is found before trial to be insane, both bases of federal jurisdiction
appear to be present. Such a person is lawfully in federal custody by rea-
son of his arrest and therefore entitled to reasonable care so long as that
custody continues; he is likewise entitled to a fair and timely trial, which
however is impossible so long as the insanity continues. It would there-
fore appear to be the government's duty to provide for his care and treat-
ment so that he may be restored to sanity as soon as possible. There is, of
course, the alternative of release, but this is barred because the govern-
ment has established probable cause for his detention on the criminal charge.
To release a putative offender may mean escape; it may also mean commis-
sion of further federal offenses, which will be no less dangerous because
the offender is legally irresponsible. Assuming a showing that the accused
is insane and not fit to be at large, there is therefore at least as substantial
a basis for federal commitment as in the case of a mere material witness.
Apart from the jurisdictional question, other legal and administrative
difficulties may cause trouble. Read by itself, Section 211 of Title 24 of
the United States Code would seem to authorize commitment to Saint
Elizabeths Hospital in the District of Columbia of all persons charged with
offenses against the United States and found insane. The difficulty is
that Section 161 of the same Title, enumerating the purposes for which
Saint Elizabeths Hospital was established, provides only that: " . .. its
object shall be the most humane care and enlightened curative treatment
of the insane of the Army and Navy of the United States and of the
District of Columbia." To be sure, Section 211 was enacted almost two
years after Section 161; but an opinion of the Attorney General rendered
in 1881 construed Section 211 as though the two enactments were con-
temporaneous.35 The result has been to exclude from the operation of
Section 211 persons charged with offenses against the United States and
found insane, except those residing in the District of Columbia or in the
armed forces. The Act of August 7, 1882,3" somewhat alleviated this con-
35. 17 Ops. AT-Y GEN. 211 (1881).
36. 22 STAT. 329, 330 (1882), 24 U. S. C. §212 (1940). The Act amended the
Act of June 23, 1874, 18 STAT. 251 (1874), which stated that the transfer of "all
persons who have been or shall be convicted of any offense in any court of the
United States, and imprisoned in any State prison or penitentiary of any State or Terri-
tory, and who, during the term of their imprisonment, have or shall become and be insane,"
was authorized on application of the Attorney General and order of the Secretary of the
Interior. In such cases the Attorney General was also authorized in the alternative to
contract with any state insane asylum within the state in which the convict was imprisoned
for his care and custody for the term of the sentence, but no longer. Retransfer to the
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dition by providing for the commitment of additional classes of accused
persons found mentally ill. Its provision for the transfer to Saint Elizabeths
Hospital of "all persons who, having been charged with offenses against
the United States, are in the actual custody of its officers, . . . and who
during the term of their imprisonment have or shall become and be insane"
has apparently been administratively construed to cover all persons arrested
on federal charges in any district, who are found to be insane and who are
not out on bail."7
The remaining legislative gap is with reference to persons charged with
federal offenses who have either not been taken into custody or who have
been released on bail. The policy basis for this gap is unclear. It may
rest on the assumption that dangerously insane persons will usually be
without funds and without friends with funds, and hence unlikely to make
bail. Or it may be thought that as a practical matter, the United States
Attorney can usually arrange matters by having bail set at a high figure,
or otherwise, so that a really dangerous individual will be in actual custody
and hence subject to the commitment provisions of the Act. Or it may
simply be that there has been a desire to limit federal commitment of the
insane, and that this limitation just happens to be the one hit upon. The
known legislative history leaves the explanation a matter of conjecture.
What has been the practice? In many cases the federal charge has been
dismissed when a prisoner has been found insane. In some of these cases,
the prisoner has then been committed by a state court or voluntarily ad-
mitted to a state institution for the mentally ill. This result has sometimes
been facilitated by appointment of the superintendent of the appropriate
state institution as one of the examining physicians in the federal proceed-
ing. In other cases, persons found insane have been committed to any one
of a number of federal institutions, including (but not limited to) the
Medical Center at Springfield, Missouri, and Saint Elizabeths Hospital.
In some instances prisoners found insane have been committed to federal
penal institutions in the locality. The chief difficulty in arranging for
state commitment arises in cases of non-determinable residence; for most
states condition entry to their state hospitals on actual voluntary residence,
prison or penitentiary in the event of a restoration of sanity was also authorized, pro-
vided the sentence had not expired.
The amended statute read: "That upon the application of the Attorney General the
Secretary of the Interior be, and is hereby, authorized and directed to transfer to the
Government Hospital for the Insane in the District of Columbia all persons who, having
been charged with offenses against the United States, are in the actual custody of its offi-
cers, and all persons who have been or shall be convicted of any offense in a court of the
United States and are imprisoned in any State prison or penitentiary of any State or
Territory, and who during the term of their imprisonment have or shall become and be
insane."
37. Holtzoff, Looking At The Law (1943) 7 FEDERAL PROBATION No. 2, 41.
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for from one to four years. In summary, it appears that in every case where
commitment seems necessary the appropriate officials work it out as best
they can, not infrequently being handicapped by the obscurities and omis-
sions in the enabling legislation.
MENTAL ILLNESS OR DEFECT AS A DEFENSE
The issue of the offender's sanity may also be raised at trial as a defense
to the federal charge. Relatively few recorded federal criminal cases have
gone to trial which involved an insanity defense and there is no legisla-
tion governing either the standard or procedure. Consequently, whenever
the issue has arisen, the courts have looked to the common law. The in-
sanity defense is, of course, recognized, and it may be raised either by spe-
cial plea or under the general issue ;38 the burden is on the claimant de-
fendant to overcome the presumption of sanity by evidence sufficient to
create a reasonable doubt.3"
The Standard. Contemporary formulations of the standard of insanity
as a defense vary in phraseology, taking as a point of departure the rule
laid down a century ago in England in McNaghten's case.40 The following
representative formulation is from an opinion handed down in 1941 in the
Southern District of California:
"To excuse an act because of insanity the degree of insanity must be
shown to have been sufficiently great to have controlled the will power
of the defendant at the time the act was committed. When reason
ceases to have dominion over the mind, proven to be diseased and the
person reaches a degree of insanity where criminal responsibility ceas-
es, accountability to the law for the purpose of punishment no longer
exists. The issue upon that point is, was the defendant's brain im-
paired to such an extent that he was incapable of forming a criminal
intent, and that his mind was not under his control by reason of this
infirmity, and his brain was compelled to it, that at the time his wil
power, judgment, reflection, and control of his mental faculties were
impaired, so that at the time he could not distinguish between right and
wrong, or that the act was done under pressure of an irresistible, and
uncontrollable impulse at the time." 4
1
38. Hotema v. United States, 186 U. S. 413 (1902); United States v. Fore, 38 F.
Supp. 140 (S. D. Calif. 1941) ; HousEL AND WA.LSE, op. cit. stipra note 1, § 397.
39. Hotema v. United States, 186 U. S. 413 (1902) ; Dais v. United States, 10 U. S.
469 (1895).
40. 10 Cl. & F. 200 (1843). See Owens v. United States, 85 F. (2d) 270 (App.
D. C., 1926); United States v. Faulkner, 35 Fed. 730 (N. D. Tex. 1888); United States
Ridgeway, 31 Fed. 144 (S. D. Ga. 1887); Guiteau's Case, 10 Fed. 161 (D. C. 1882);
United States v. Shults, Fed. Cas. No. 16,286, 6 McLean 121 (D. Ohio 1854).
41. United States v. Fore, 38 F. Supp. 140, 141 (S. D. Calif. 1941).
TU
A substantially similar charge was approved by the Supreme Court in
1902 in the Hotema case,42 involving a member of the Choctaw Indian
tribe. Since an alleged belief on the part of the defendant that the victim
of his homicide was a witch was an element in the case, the charge also dealt
specifically with the subject of delusions. It was stated that in order to
excuse the accused's conduct, a belief such as that attributed to the de-
fendant must be "the product of a diseased brain" and his act "the result
of such diseased brain."
Disposition. If the interposition of a defense of insanity in a federal
court is followed by acquittal of the accused, there is no statutory provision
for further detention or commitment. Sections 211 and 212 of Title 24
hardly seem applicable, as one who has been acquitted is no longer con-
sidered charged with an offense, nor is he supposed to be in custody. The
statement in a contemporary treatise on federal criminal procedure that
"If a defendant is acquitted on the ground of insanity, commitment to an
institution generally follows, for observation and detention until cured"
must therefore be taken to refer to action by cooperative state authorities.
43
Here, again, our legislation is inadequate. Where state commitment is
both available and reliable, it may well be the most appropriate way of dis-
posing of a troublesome mental case; but when one who has committed a
federal offense is thus disposed of, the federal government loses control
of the situation. An inmate who is a real hazard may be released in a
relatively short time from some state institutions; for many of these mental
hospitals are over-crowded, and some are unduly susceptible to local influ-
ences. There is, moreover, the problem, already noted, of the person without
a determinable legal residence. Suppose the case of another Guiteau, with
paranoid designs on the President of the United States. If such a person
were acquitted as insane after one assassination attempt, should not the
federal government be authorized to commit him to an appropriate federal
institution, in the event that state commitment proved for one reason or
another not feasible?
MENTAL ILLNESs DISCOVERED OR OCCURRING AFTER CONVICTION AND
COMMITMENT
Prisoners are often found to be insane after entering upon the service
of their sentences, at the outset and later. It may appear that the insanity
probably antedated the conviction, or that it developed after receipt of the
offender by the Bureau of Prisons. Moreover, iii some cases sanity may be
restored prior to the expiration of the sentence, and in others it may not be.
These various situations raise a series of separate problems.
42. Hotema v. United States, 186 U. S. 413, 419 (1902).
43. Housa. AND VWALSER, op. cit. supra note 1, § 573.
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Disposition of Convicts Found M entally Ill or Dcfective On Receipt By
The Bureau of Prisons. It was said in the Youtsel, case" that "It is funda-
mental that an insane person can neither plead to an arraignment, be sub-
jected to a trial, or, after trial receive judgment, or, after judgment, un-
dergo punishment." The reference in the last clause is, of course, to the com-
mon law rule that if one under sentence of death becomes insane after
conviction, execution is to be deferred until sanity is restoredAl (Per-
haps, as the court which issued this dictum and some commentators have as-
sumed, this common law rule could be successfuly invoked in capital cases
in the federal courts; no case has actually been found in which the situation
has arisen.)
Convicts sentenced to terms of imprisonment and found, on receipt by
the Bureau, to be mentally ill or defective are by no means uncommon.
More often than not it will appear that such mental illness or defect prob-
ably existed at the time of arraignment or trial, and it may likewise appear
that it probably existed at the time of the commission of the offense. What
is to be done in this situation?
As already explained, the government or counsel for the prisoner could
move for a new trial within the time allowed for such motions, or attempt
to avail themselves of certain other possible remedies. But prisoners are
usually without counsel at this stage, and there is no established adminis-
trative policy favoring the re-opening of such cases. Existing legislation
providing for the transfer of prisoners who are or become insane from
penal institutions to mental hospitals fails to distinguish between prisoners
of the kind now under discussion and those who develop serious mental
illness after entering upon the service of their sentences.
This failure to differentiate between these dissimilar categories of prison-
ers constitutes another defect in our federal scheme, for it obviously does
violence to considerations of due process and elementary justice. Commit-
ment of persons who are mentally ill or have serious defects in any case
appears unwise. Our federal penal institutions are not primarily de-
signed or equipped for the care and treatment of the mentally ill. To
sentence one of these offenders when his illness or defect is determinable
in advance is not only unfortunate for the individual, but also a positive
nuisance to the prison authorities. An administrative practice designed to
return such convicts to the courts for more appropriate disposition would
make prosecuting attorneys and judges more alert to the problem and go
far to convince them of the desirability of avoiding criminal jurisdiction
in such cases.
Disposition of Convicts Found Mentally Ill or Defective While Sct-ing
Their Sentences. When a federal prisoner serving his sentence in a state
44. Youtsey v. United States, 97 Fed. 937 (C. C. A. 6th, 1S99).
45. 1 Wn.N.rA~o, Cj-m=.L LAW (12th ed. 1932) § 77; 1 HAwxn.s P. C. c. 1, § 3.
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or territorial institution is found to have become insane, Section 212 of
Title 24 of the United States Code authorizes his transfer to Saint Eliza-
beths Hospital, upon application by the Attorney General and order of the
Federal Security Administrator. When such a prisoner is serving his sen-
tence in a federal penal institution, Section 876 of Title 18 authorizes his
transfer on order of the Attorney General to the United States Hospital for
Defective Delinquents or any other institution authorized by law to receive
such offenders. In neither case is a judicial hearing required.4
Section 876 creates a Board of Examiners for each federal penal and
correctional institution, consisting of a medical officer appointed by the
warden or superintendent, a medical officer appointed by the Attorney
General, and a psychiatrist designated by the Surgeon General of the United
States Public Health Service. Each board examines inmates alleged to
have become mentally ill or defective and reports its findings to the Attor-
ney General, who may then initiate transfer proceedings. Provision is
made in both Sections 212 and 876 for the retransfer of prisoners in the
event that they are restored to sanity, while their sentences remain unex-
pired.
Disposition of Convicts Found Mentally Ill or Defective When Their
Sentences Are About to Expire. Section 2 11 (a) of Title 24 might be read
as purporting to authorize the transfer of an insane convict to Saint Eliza-
beths Hospital and his detention there "during the continuance of his
mental disorder," without regard to the expiration of his term of sentence;
such, however, has not been the official interpretation. In 1927 the Attor-
ney General rendered an opinion that a convict whose term of imprison-
ment had expired and who was then confined in St. Elizabeths Hospital
should be returned as soon as practicable to his state of residence, for care
and maintenance in a state institution.4 This opinion rested in part on a
construction of Section 212 of the same Title as intended to secure proper
treatment for federal prisoners "during the term of their imprisonment"
only, in-part on the absence of any provision in the statute for notice and
a judicial hearing on the issue of insanity, and in part on the policy ap-
parent in other statutes in pari nateria and in Department of the Interior
appropriation acts. In this connection, it should also be noted that Sec-
tion 213 of Title 24, providing for the transfer of insane federal prisoners
to state hospitals on a contract basis, expressly provides that "no contract
shall be made or compensation paid for the care of such insane persons
beyond their respective terms of imprisonment."
Section 876 of Title 18 limits the period of custody of prisoners trans-
ferred under that Act to such time as "the maximum sentence, without de-
46. 8 Ops. Air'y GEN. 390 (1857). See White v. Treibly, 19 F. (2d) 712 (App.
D. C. 1927); 35 Ops. Arr'y GEN. 366 (1927) ; 30 Ops. AT-FY GEN. 569 (1916).
47. 35 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 366 (1927).
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duction for good time or commutation of sentence, shall have been served."
Section 878 provides for notice, to the proper authorities of the State,
District, or Territory where the convict has his legal residence, of the
date of expiration of the sentence of any insane convict, who, in the judg-
ment of the superintendent of the federal hospital is still insane or a
menace to the public. Where legal residence cannot be ascertained, the
notice is given to the authorities of the place from which he was com-
mitted.
Here again it would seem that the possibility of federal commitment
should be open, in cases where the stateless individual constitutes a real
threat to federal interests. The basis for federal jurisdiction in such
cases is the same as in the case of persons merely charged with offenses
against the United States and found insane.
CONCLUSION
Existing arrangements for dealing with mentally disordered and de-
fective federal offenders are inadequate, both on the legislative and the
administrative levels. Despite the rudimentary development of the federal
law, the problems involved are neither unusual nor esoteric; most of them
have for some time been the subject of e-\periment and legislative revision
in many states. The general policy with respect to electing to exercise
federal as against state jurisdiction, moreover, has not been clear and poses
another group of problems.
Certain changes in the existing statutes and practices have been recom-
mended in the course of this article. These should be effectuated through
comprehensive revision of the relevant provisions of Titles IS and 24,
rather than through rules of court or the process of judicial decision in
particular cases; for the indicated changes involve alterations in penal
administration as well as judicial procedure. Amendments of the existing
statutes are necessary to establish jurisdiction in certain situations, to
clarify policy, and to prescribe procedures. Furthermore, new or addi-
tional appropriations will be needed to effectuate certain of the suggested
reforms.
The point, of course, is not that the federal government should compete
with the states in the care and treatment of the mentally ill and defective.
Nor should the federal government encourage the states to dumo as federal
charges individuals who should be cared for in local mental hospitals. The
statutory authorizations for federal commitment should in all instances
be permissive rather than mandatory; and administrative practice should be
alert to discourage the pressing of federal criminal charges, where the
impetus comes primarily from local officials desirous of ridding themselves
of a local public assistance problem.
